Abstract

Why do some ceasefires last only a few days, while others are instrumental in bringing about a durable end to civil war? In response, this study proposes a dual typology of international intervention in civil war and applies the logic of commitment problems to the impacts each type of intervention has on ceasefire success. According to the proposed theory, the commitment problem present at the implementation stage of the ceasefire agreement is exacerbated by an intervening belligerent actor’s presence in the agreement and is mitigated by the presence of an intervening mediating actor. As such, the involvement of a belligerent intervening actor should be predictive of a less successful ceasefire while the involvement of mediating intervening actor should be predictive of a more successful ceasefire. A regression analysis of 156 ceasefires since 1947 produces unexpected outcomes. The results suggest that intervention of any type is predictive of unsuccessful ceasefires. These findings have significant implications for policy-makers and military leaders alike, namely that interventionist foreign policy is not conducive to global peace and that supranational organizations should be wary of entering domestic conflicts at the risk of having an adverse effect on the peace process.

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