Abstract
Scholars have long studied how the Supreme Court and individual justices make decisions, particularly in cases involving the President of the United States. Existing literature often concentrates on either internal or external factors and the subsequent impact on the Court’s decision-making, while few scholars examine both Court-specific and contemporary issues for an all-inclusive analysis. I seek to identify which factors influence judicial decision-making in cases involving the president, and I advance existing theories by evaluating both political ideology and the effects of wartime along with issue-based controls. Justices should be more likely to defer to the president in cases heard during wartime and when sharing political ideology with the sitting president. I evaluate this claim with data on Supreme Court cases regarding presidential power between the years 1933 and 2008 as provided by Howell and Ahmed (2014) and find substantive support concerning an increase in deference to the president.
How to Cite
Gill, D., (2021) “The President’s Day in Court: How The Supreme Court Checks Executive Power”, Capstone, The UNC Asheville Journal of Undergraduate Scholarship 34(1).
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