

COMPARING INCOMPATIBILITIES:

AN AMBIGUOUS DIALOGUE WITH NATIVE PEDAGOGIES

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to construct a theoretical framework in order to conduct a knowledge/wisdoms dialogue on the theme of pedagogy with the native Mapuche people living in Chile. Part of the problems of such a task are comparative (between pedagogies) and the specific problem that concern this article is the relation of compatibility/incompatibility between these pedagogies. The article proposes to use the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze to theorize incompatibility as a positive although disruptive event centred on his notions of *knowledge*, *learning* and *encounter*, as well as taking into account his broader scope of understanding *problems* in general. To further develop and specialize these notions the article takes up the methodological reflections on *comparison*, *translation* and the *equivocal* by the anthropologist Viveiros De Castro.

Keywords: knowledge, mapuche, pedagogy, critical, intercultural

INTRODUCTION

This article is part of a postdoc (“ANID FONDECYT POSTDOC 3200009”) project that has as its purpose to construct a knowledge/wisdoms dialogue (*diálogo de conocimiento/saberes*) with the native Mapuche people (*mapu*: land/*che* people) living in Chile with respect to the theme of pedagogy. The article will attempt to construct a research methodology based on the notion of dialogue, something that does not require the long and in-depth ethnographic fieldwork characteristic of anthropology but which strives to rework the often one-sided relationship present in many other social science research methodologies. The purpose of this article is to try to construct a theoretical framework for such a dialogical methodology. To accomplish this, it will begin by considering some of the main problems.

Education that tries to include native people in Latin America is commonly referred to as ‘intercultural’ education. In Chile, this notion has been around since the nineties and have by now been firmly institutionalized and embraced on many levels by Chileans and native people alike working in education. Two of the main goals of this policy in Chile are a reversal of native language deterioration and a general improvement of intercultural relations leading to a healthier and more productive education.

Critical voices within native and intellectual circles point out that not only is the reversal of language deterioration failing (Loncon, 2017; Zúñiga & Olate, 2017), but also that the improved intercultural relationship frequently aims towards a traditional assimilationist position. This position sees intercultural education as a principal means to improve native peoples performance of traditional educational disciplines (math, Spanish, biology, etc.) as well as to integrate them into the market economy, for example in the tourist industry. In critical Latin American discourse these assimilationist aspects are often placed within a broader category and referred to as *colonial* relations. In the specific case of intercultural relations, this colonial relation is often called a *structural* or *functional* model of intercultural relations (Loncon, 2017; Tubino, 2004, 2005; Walsh, 2009). From a North American perspective of Community-based participatory research

(CBPR), this critique would be located in what Pontes and Gendron calls the “Southern tradition” (Pontes & Gendron 2011). They differentiate between two forms of CBPR, a southern “participatory” approach inspired by popular liberation and authors like Paolo Freire and a northern “action” approach inspired by Kurt Lewin.

A very similar critique is often voiced in research in regards to one-sided methodologies that lack mutual participation. In Chile, when trying to study the Mapuche people, they often show signs of irritation when faced with traditional research proposals where the possibilities of co-labor or co-determination are limited beforehand. Co-labor or determination means the possibility to define and have a say both when it comes to the guiding research problems that define the study, as well as in its uses and its intellectual property rights. Currently, one response to this from universities has been to enforce the ethical protocols required to study native people, for example, requiring an ever stricter informed consent (*consentimiento informado*) when doing interviews or other research that involves native people. This is often coupled with the stressed need for a type of ‘giving-back’ of the information acquired in the first place, a nice but vague idea which is pretty much up to the researcher.

In traditional one-sided methodology, a research perspective would define the problems that the Mapuche pedagogy would have to answer by asking questions pertaining to a logic the researcher could imagine to be relevant for the field of pedagogy. This approach assumes that both types of knowledge are somehow compatible. This problem becomes increasingly troublesome when we take into account the type of dialogue we are aiming at here, between our naturalized forms of pedagogy (Western/Chilean) and Mapuche pedagogy. This is problematic on several levels. First, because knowledge on Mapuche pedagogy is scarce, since it has only recently entered western discourses as something worthy of study. Secondly, because the initial theme of these studies seems filled with what might be defined as incompatible relations of knowledge with regard to western onto-epistemic structures. And last, because one-sided methodologies reinforce an already problematic relationship in the sense of colonial

power relations, something very present in the current political and educational climate in Chile.

To my knowledge, in-depth research in Chile on Mapuche pedagogy seem today extremely limited. One example could be the book; “*Interculturalidad en Contexto Mapuche*” (Quilaqueo et al., 2010), which collects various articles of interest from different research initiatives. One of its articles proposes that one of three forms underlying Mapuche pedagogy is *kimeltuwün* or teaching (*enseñanza*) (Quilaqueo, 2010). Within this theme, however, there are various sub-themes. One of these themes has to do with how dreams (*pewma*) can operate as sources of knowledge. I am using this example because I cannot think of any relevant pedagogical problems that might take up such an idea, simply because it goes against most rationalized and secularized forms of understanding knowledge.

From this, we would like to surmise that the main problem is a level of relation presupposing that for knowledge to be viable, it has to construct compatibility, but in fact, encompass a certain incompatibility from which there is no escape or final solution. Most research does not consider incompatibility in methodological terms. To some extent this revolves around an old epistemological problem, the problem of the third position in comparative terms. Could the approach of *pewma* within *kimeltuwün* teach us something not just about the Mapuche as people or about how humans have taught in the *past sense*, but in fact about teaching in the general and *present sense* of the term? One does not need, however, to *resolve* this question to work in empowering, affirmative and creative ways with Mapuche pedagogy. Instead, one might see the relationship of incompatibility as a creative bond, one that lets you think and problematize pedagogy in new ways without having to enter the reductive state of either/or with regards to *pewma* as sources of knowledge. This reductive state limits the possibilities that any system of knowledge can present because it reduces the problem in absolute terms to one of either compatibility (is there any proof?) or incompatibility in the sense of irrelevance (I do not believe this). One might say, there is no third position in absolute terms, but that does not mean that one cannot create a new or different

position, one that is neither compatible nor incompatible in absolute terms with whatever positions was started out from.

If no transcendent recourse to a ‘higher’ truth or a ‘solving’ or ‘objective’ third position exists that can level the incompatibilities into one plane, then how does one deal with it? How to create a dialogical research alternative that takes as its origin the incompatibility itself without reducing it to irrelevance? What is needed is a theoretical perspective that thinks about incompatibility in positive terms, or more precisely, that turns incompatibility into a positive learning event.

This forces a focus on the intersection between pedagogy and anthropology, that is, to ask both about the process of learning and about anthropological alternatives to viewing the native relationship. To work through the theoretical groundwork for such an attempt, this article will draw upon certain parts of the pedagogical philosophy of Gille Deleuze. Of specific interest are some of his ideas on learning and incompatibility from his book on difference and repetition (1994). Deleuze’s theory, however, is very general. Therefore, the article will use anthropology to concretize this in regards to native relations. Of specific interest here is a tradition called ‘recursive anthropology’ or sometimes also ‘the ontological turn’, a tradition that develops native relations in part from an inspiration in Deleuze. From within this tradition, the article will primarily draw upon a Brazilian anthropologist by the name of Viveiros De Castro.

DELEUZE ON KNOWLEDGE, LEARNING AND THE ENCOUNTER

For Deleuze, a problem, or what he also refers to as an idea, is not an intellectualized, humanized or epistemological set of propositions in representational forms. Instead, it must be understood by the widest possible range of meanings it can have generally in life. A monkey can have a problem, how to get to the food which is situated in the other tree, or evolution can have one, how to proceed from here. Problems come with specific solutions which are just that, pragmatic ‘answers’ to the problems, the monkey jumps, the zebra evolves, etc.. A situation can force life to pose a problem, something that will require an answer. To distinguish the two, Deleuze speaks of problems as the *virtual*

where answers are the *actualized*, hence the virtual being actualized in certain pragmatic forms. This perspective removes the problem from its academic form of propositions and sees it as a generalized activity in response to the world, something that is not just limited to epistemic or human (cultural) aspects but generalizable to ontological processes well beyond the human sphere. Since present research do not know the kind of problems Mapuche pedagogy can pose, it might be a good idea to broaden the understanding of problems beforehand.

Alongside this widening of what a problem might be, Deleuze also develops a more specific understanding. He distinguishes between problems of a more dull or boring nature and those he calls interesting problems. In a general sense an interesting problem is when the problem is related to the very limit of our own knowledge and being. What Deleuze calls the *non-being* is the being of the problematic, or to put it more accurately, the relationship between being and non-being is the being of the problematic. Being in this sense is analogue to knowing, which means that an interesting problem arises when our knowledge is related or faced with its own limits, what it considers not to be knowledge at all (dreams?). Interesting problems therefore come from relating to what lies outside our own horizons of knowledge and being, or to put it differently, a problem that relates to what is incompatible with our current forms of knowledge/being. Here, two reasons point to a Mapuche pedagogy being equivalent to the Deleuzian non-being. First, because it occupies such a minimal space in the fields of discourse (academia, politics, education, etc.), e.g. current research has little knowledge of it, and secondly, in the little knowledge current research seem to have, because there appear to be incompatible aspects in relation to pedagogical knowledge. This is another way of saying that it is situated at the very limits of current academic knowledge.

This is reflected in the deleuzian relationship between *knowledge*, *learning* and what he calls the *encounter*. To understand this we refer to chapter 3, *the Image of Thought* in his book *Difference and Repetition* (Deleuze, 1994). This is part of his critique of what he calls the dogmatic image of thought. In this chapter Deleuze attacks the idea of common sense as an idea related to both recognition and

representational forms. Aligned with common sense are good will (sincerity) as well as the assumption that thought has some kind of affinity for truth, what he calls the upright nature on the part of thought (p.131). One important aspect of this is the assumption that recognition implies a ‘harmonious exercise of all the faculties’ in the sense that all our faculties (hearing, feeling, imagination, thinking, touching, memory, etc.) somehow present a natural kind of collaboration which constitutes the unity of a thinking subject. As such, dogmatic thought assumes a harmony and collaboration between all of the human faculties, a harmony which somehow presupposes an integrated whole or unity.

In Deleuze the idea of harmony is tied up with common sense because common sense is that which appears without any problems, as it is represented in its immediately available representational forms, a chair, a colour, a horse, etc. Harmony between faculties and representational forms align in common sense and in knowledge by not provoking any problems. Mundane everyday being and knowledge, that which is know to be true because it works, do not disturb or provoke thought, and precisely therefore it is, for lack of a more sophisticated word, dull and boring. To some extent this is Deleuze’s notion of knowledge. He uses the word knowledge in its end form of already knowing and the result of something having already happened, which is what he calls his 8th postulate (pp.164-167). That which has already happened is learning, which is then contrasted to knowledge. While learning is the process of acquiring new knowledge, the emphasis of Deleuze here is on its destructive capacities in that it requires a process of destroying foregoing knowledge. To learn, one needs to destroy existing knowledge, and this turns his idea of learning away from any cumulative forms of knowledge. This presents representational forms and common knowledge as inhibitors to learning, learning being contrasted as an inherently creative and transformative act. The presupposed harmony between the faculties in common sense does not operate in learning, except as a lack of. To shatter this idea of harmony he presents the faculties as diverging projects between which discord and violence emerge when in the process of learning (Deleuze, p.141).

For example, between what one hears, one feels and what one thinks, there might not be any natural agreement in the act of learning. In knowledge they seem harmonious, one does not doubt the apple is an apple (one sees it, one tastes it, one knows it) but in learning they come into conflict and do violence to each other. Deleuze uses the example of swimming. Testing one's limits in swimming it is quite common for the different faculties to appear to do violence to one another, or put in a different way, inform you in contradicting ways. One might feel the almost neurotic need to look up all the time to see if the end has been reached (to not bounce your head against the wall of the swimming pool), while another sense might inform you that you are only half way across and have many meters to go before hitting the wall. It would appear that your eyes don't believe what the orientation sense is trying to tell you. Another example could be a German exchange student trying to take a 'micro' (a small bus) in Chile for the first time. He might quickly catch on to the fact that this type of chaotic little bus might not have a stop bottom like German buses. But while his intellect is telling him to do what he sees others do, just shout when he wants to get off, another faculty (perhaps a moral one) inside of him is telling him how awful shouting is and that 'proper people' don't do this. Deleuze describes the instigation of such a violence or rupture by the word *encounter*, which is perhaps a generalized sense of an opening within an event towards something that lies on the limit of what is known. Therefore, the encounter instigates a relation between being and non-being by becoming a problem.

Some might argue that learning in these examples requires some kind of *overcoming* of or perhaps a kind of *fusion* with these differences. In this case, learning would imply an overcoming of the disharmony in swimming and that the German exchange student accept that he has to shout without feeling guilty or strange when doing so. I would argue that the specific characteristics of a deleuzian metaphysics is precisely to put a kind of parenthesis on this type of fusion or overcoming. The argument is deep within his critique of western representational metaphysics and related to the problem of thinking identity or unity as primary and differences as secondary. Focusing on an overcoming or a fusion in learning is directly related

to the metaphysical emphasis on unity or identity as primary, and this relegates differences and whatever alternative modes these might potentially encompass to a secondary place which gets subordinated to the primordial identity or unity.

The question then becomes, how is it possible to relate Mapuche pedagogy to a secular and western pedagogy without a process of subordination that sees the Mapuche differences as secondary to this secular and western pedagogical identity? To suggest that a dialogue could do this would require a suspension of the form that requires a resolution in the sense of solution, or *re-solution*. It is not the purpose of such a dialogue to *overcome* or to *resolve* the matter in any way since there is no higher unity or identity into which the parts in conflict can become resolved. Therefore, dialogue as a way to try and understand Mapuche pedagogy must suspend the idea of learning as overcoming or fusion and instead adopt the idea of learning as encounter, and then attempt to trace the specific encounters and ruptures. One has to remember that one is trying to learn about a tradition (Mapuche pedagogy) that has altogether different historical roots, even though it might also be bound to a colonial and recent history together with western pedagogy. The general framework of Deleuze does not address the specific problem of native relations, which is why the article must now turn to anthropology. The consequences of a deleuzian-oriented metaphysics is perhaps best fleshed out in a specific anthropological tradition called ‘recursive anthropology’.

VIVEIROS DE CASTRO AND EQUIVOCAL TRANSLATION

The tradition of ‘recursive anthropology’ has been elaborated as an academic tradition during approximately the last 20 years. Within this tradition, the article will specifically draw upon Viveiros De Castro, a Brazilian anthropologist and one of its main proponents. One of De Castro’s sources of inspiration is precisely Deleuze, which means that the article will attempt to clarify some of his inspirational sources within Deleuze while going through some of his central methodological reflections. While in Deleuze an encounter

can basically be anything, the specific encounter in anthropology is the native one. The putting in parenthesis of the overcoming has as intended purpose the emergence and empowering of differences as a source of creative inspiration and thinking, that is, creative-destructive intent in the Deleuzian form but used here for anthropological relations. This tradition has in common with Deleuze the empowering of differences, and an empowerment that tries to make them relevant precisely as differences.

De Castro and recursive anthropology presupposes that native worlds are radical alterities, which means that their knowledge/being is presumed to be radically different from the western and secular tradition of knowledge. In this sense, the deleuzian notion of encounter resonates with the anthropological notion of radical alterity. This alterity points to an encounter because of the inability to overcome or accumulate on top of already possessed knowledge when faced with native differences. To learn about these forms of knowledge/being what is needed is a parallel thread that links this to an unlearning and questioning of the types of knowledge already possessed.

While Deleuze focuses on common knowledge aligned with representation as the blocking point to encounters and creative thought, his categories are very generalized notions. An encounter could basically come from anywhere, the only condition being the disruption and disharmony (between faculties) of the harmoniously operating knowledge to, hopefully, provoke a learning process. In De Castro the encounter is seen as an ethnographical encounter, which means that the specific event and effect produced by an encounter is conceived of as others having a different common. This is not a problem for the theory of Deleuze because what is common to others is just another way of framing what might be uncommon, or implying an interest in engaging with the one that thinks differently.

De Castro describes such a possible ethnographic encounter by the word *equivocal*. The purpose here is to get away from the idea of ‘error’ or ‘mistake’ since this would imply an already shared common language game or some fundamental and univocal system of common and cumulative references. This epistemology extends to ontology as well, since ontological systems (‘reality’) are just as myriad and

plural as epistemological ones. It is necessary to presuppose that such commonality is not shared, and even if some things are still shared, discursive resources are better placed on looking for what is not shared. By applying the word equivocal De Castro is deliberately presuming that the two sides are never talking about the same thing. In the spirit of Deleuze he writes; “since it is only worth comparing the incommensurable, comparing the commensurable is a task for accountants, not anthropologists” (De Castro, 2004 p. 11).

The purpose of an ethnographer should be to situate oneself in the space of equivocation and dwell there. Comparison should be in the service of translation and not the opposite. Translation therefore is key and he calls it a “method of controlled equivocation” (De Castro, 2004). A good ethnographic translator should strive to betray the destination language, hence deliberately seeking out differences and ambiguities. The equivocal and its ambiguities are therefore the ethnographical and methodological response of De Castro to Deleuze’s idea of the rupture of the harmonious faculties by the encounter. It is a deliberate turning away from embracing what constitutes common or normal knowledge by trying to install the rupture as a primary epistemological motor into our thoughts and academic paradigms. Returning to Deleuze, the equivocal as a heuristic or methodological tool would be an ethnographical form of trying to encourage an emphasis with respect to the emergence of encounters, a kind of heuristic attempt to use the disharmony in encounters, or the betrayal in a translation, in a productive form.

But, how to think about the relationship with the other from these premises? The rupture, understood as the betrayal in a process of translation, has its fracturing function on *our* language (destination language) and not on the language of *them*. De Castro proposes that the task of anthropology is not about unifying the plural (or generalizing the particular), but instead multiplying the agents of the world (2010 p. 96). This task is also formulated by saying that it is not about *explaining their* world, but rather about *multiplying our* world. In this sense, the fracturing of *our* world is directly aligned with the possibility of multiplication that comes from trying to understand *their* world precisely because it is a process of learning. Learning only

comes at the expense and destruction of knowledge, in this case, *our* knowledge.

The point of intersection or inspiration for De Castro in Deleuze is here relatively easy to pinpoint. We might propose this point in the following description.

“...not to explicate oneself too much with the other, not to explicate the other too much, but to maintain one’s implicit values and multiply one’s own world by populating it with all those expressed that do not exist apart from their expressions. For it is not the other which is another I, but the I which is an other, a fractured I.” (Deleuze, 1994, p.261).

For Deleuze the difference in regard to another is often conceived of immanently, that is, that this other persists within oneself as other, hence the fractured I. The idea of not overdoing the *explanation* in De Castro is then related to the idea in Deleuze of not *actualizing* the other, and instead, maintaining the other as a virtual field or a constant possibility. In a sense *actualizing* (or explaining) the other too much kills it as a virtual possibility, just as constructing identity as primary can kill of differences by inclusion. In De Castro this simultaneously becomes ethical advice: “always leave a way out for the people you are describing” (De Castro, 2014, p.13). It is not about *explaining* them (knowing them), but instead about how I can learn from them to multiply (expand-broaden) my own perspective of the world by multiplying differences immanently, or within my own onto-epistemology.

The following question highlights and defines this problem in a more precise manner: “What happens when the anthropologist’s objective ceases to be that of explaining, interpreting, contextualizing, or rationalizing native thought, but instead begins to deploy it, drawing out its consequences, and verifying the effects that it can produce on our thinking?” (De Castro, 2013, p. 489). This word, *deploy*, is perhaps where De Castro and recursive anthropology are most at odds with mainstream thinking. To understand this however one needs to take into consideration Marilyn Strathern, who, from the perspective of recursive anthropology, was the first to draw out this consequence in

full. Strathern *deploys* her Melanesian ethnography and plugs it into a discussion with Western feminist critique, and in this way, imports something of Melanesian thinking into western debates and discourses (Salmon, 2017). To ‘import’ here would be the equivalent of De Castro’s ‘multiply’ by expanding the critical scope of feminism with Melanesian thinking. In the argument of Gildas Salmon, this exposes itself to real social critique in order to escape the self-referential loop of much postmodern discourse (pp.50-55). As such, to *deploy* means to transpose native thought from being on a level where it remains an object of scrutiny or an ‘artefact in a museum’ to deploy it directly on the level where western discourses operate and debate with one another. This would mean deploying Mapuche pedagogy directly on the level of western pedagogy in order to engage in a dialogue, and without recourse to a third position that presumes neutrality and/or superiority.

This, in the words of De Castro, requires a small fiction, a fiction that consists in “taking indigenous ideas as concepts” (2013, p. 484). This fiction rearranges the relations of distance and proximity between *our* thought and *their* thought, by drawing into proximity their ideas and hence removing the traditional symbolic distance that such a move might prohibit. His references to Deleuze here are more explicitly taken from *What is Philosophy?* (Deleuze, Guattari, 1994), and not just with regard to the concept. He is directly referring to ‘preconceptual ground of immanence’ as well as ‘conceptual persona’ which, together with the ‘concept’ are the three important components that make up philosophy for Deleuze and Guattari. Making the move of De Castro is, to my mind, taking the ultimate anthropological consequences of Deleuze and Guattari’s general idea of concepts being constructions and inventions. In Deleuze and Guattari concepts are “centres of vibration, they resonate, rather than cohere or correspond” (1994, p.23). Understanding them as inventions means to understand them ultimately within incompatible frames of intensities between being and non-being. Therefore, an overreaching system of truth and correspondence must give way to a system where the criterion of truth itself must be to redefine it as a variant (Maniglier, 2017). This is the central idea of anthropology as a comparative art focused on “the

comparison between different systems of comparisons” (De Castro, 2010, p.71). The idea of ‘multiplying us’ with De Castro corresponds to the idea in Deleuze that philosophical concepts bring forth “an event that surveys us” (Deleuze, Guattari, 1994, p. 28).

CONCLUSIONS

What then, might a dialogue be about from these perspectives? Such a dialogue cannot be about western academic knowledge *accumulating* from access to native knowledge. If that was the case, one might as well just use the standard repertoire of refined methods already in place and designed for this purpose. One would need to rearrange the basic constituents to try to facilitate the emergence of encounter in the deleuzian sense. There is no way to control encounters as such, but one might try to control the conditions of such a dialogue in order to facilitate the emergence of encounters.

One important aspect of this would be to try to *maintain ambiguity*, and here, in direct contrast to the idea of *overcoming*. This is directly related to the overall goal of such a dialogue in regard to the idea of the equivocal. The proposal is to see notions like *kimeltuwün* not as a translated *equivalent* to teaching but instead as a translated *equivocal* to teaching. This requires maintaining whatever ambiguities and equivocations might be brought out during such a dialogue and encounter. Initially this means to concentrate on the ideas that one does *not* understand, or alternatively, that seems *provocative* to some degree. This is of course completely counter-intuitive and corresponds to following in the path of a rupture of the common representational knowledge in Deleuze.

By pointing out translation an essential aspect when trying to deal with such ambiguity must be language, or to be specific, the differences between languages. Comprehension of languages and their embodied worlds is a process that can reflect colonial structures. In contemporary Chile, the Mapuche often speak more Spanish than Mapudungun. The Spanish that they speak is often interwoven with meanings that are much better understood thinking from within the context of their original language. When a Spanish word implies meanings not from the conventional Spanish speaking context within

which it is used I call it a *grieta*, or in English, a crack, as in ‘cracking open’ the cemented surface of the Spanish speaking meaning context (“Author. Blinded for review”). Such divergent language use testify that a language and its world are both interconnected as well as can be separated for purposes of survival, resistance and learning. A dialogue that seeks out ambiguity in such uses, while relevant for the betrayal of any translation, would need the support of the original language context in order to be understood. Therefore, it is extremely important that the Mapuche speak their original language (Mapudungun) during these dialogues. Incompatibilities, rather than trying to trace them from Mapuche meanings buried within the Spanish language, are easier to trace through a translation because it is in itself a comparison. This brings the idea into alignment with what the mapuche often refer to as a recovery or revitalization (*recuperación* or *revitalización*), which is their attempt to revitalize their own language and culture from within colonial and asymmetrical relations, a political and cultural project they have been actively advocating at least since the eighties.

To maintain ambiguity would attempt to deny the overcoming by higher synthesis of any implicit differences found and as such would aim to pluralize and empower the differences of the world. The purpose would be to contextualize the analysis around the ambiguities of the translation of the dialogue instead of relegating the inconsistencies to a second tier location. Following De Castro, the betrayal in the translation should be the Archimedean point by which comparisons circulate, and not the other way around. Instead of; what does *kimeltuwün* mean?, we might ask, what does it mean in the ways that does *not* affirm western and secular pedagogy? The ‘not’ here does not refer to contradictions or oppositions, but instead to subtle divergences or differences that instead open up something ‘in the middle of’ or ‘outside of’ whatever seems to be limiting the imagination of the comparison. Might this open up possibilities for creative thought and what Deleuze calls ‘lines of flight’ for a critical pedagogy? Not in its ability to create a new synthetic theory of pedagogy by combining different parts, but in its constant disruption of whatever is consider common in pedagogical thought and action.. Such a constant disruption would continuously place the researcher

into the role of being researched, perhaps in resonance to how Paolo Freire transforms the relationship between teacher and student (1996). By doing this one seeks a methodological condition where the act of questioning the pedagogical normality is a positive, or in the delezian sense, a 'joyous' act in and of itself.

The process of this dialogue would have to be co-laboured with the Mapuche. A co-labouring here means not just the practical form of the dialogue itself but also with respect to its posterior use and purpose, for example in terms of publication and authorship. But one would need a fixed-point for this dialogue, something around which it could approach the topic of translating pedagogies. The key here is what kind of idea could guide such an ambiguous task of comparing incompatibilities. Such an idea could be *problems*, hence the comparison or contextualization of pedagogies through the deliberate thinking of them as problems. What kinds of problems does Mapuche pedagogy present?, and what kinds of contrasts and ambiguities does this present to the problems of a modern and western pedagogy? Problems can be compared and discussed without having to consummate them together. This opens up a virtual way of understanding without the need to actualize it in the same movement, that is, the purpose is not to 'solve' or 'resolve' the problems. This is where Deleuze's broadening of the understanding of problems comes in.

Problems in this sense needs to be posed in ways that open themselves up to learning from Indigenous people, intercultural ways that may seem contrary to or in tension with traditional developmentalist approaches such as those described by Escobar (1995). In the case of health issues, which seems to be a strong focus of the North American CBPR, there is a world of difference between a problem with a solution already posited and projected such as "native Americans don't live healthy lives" and an open problem such as "what are the nutritional perspectives of native Americans?". In its scientifically sounding jargon, the first problem might begin with a documentation of "negative behavioral patterns within the community" (Burhansstipanov, Christopher, Schumacher 2005 pp. 71), which then is in need of immediate intervention. The problem

then becomes driven by the need to produce results, implementations and improvements towards a social state of things we are already too familiar with, as in the eschatological end point of a modern socio-economical thinking, which includes health and many other issues. An analogue problem might be posed for literacy, between “we need to teach *them* how to read” and “how might *they* read the world?”. One opens to the virtual, asks to learn, and can concentrate on strengthening incompatibilities and differences, while the other begs to be actualized, put into action, and presumes a commonality which may not be the case. If a *lack of* is already established with a “*they* don’t eat or read well”, then “*we*” can dispense with philosophy and intercultural dialogue and go straight to statistics, or whatever means we use to solve this problem. I agree with Simone Bignall on this account; “These discourses, and the policies that are informed by them, act to reinforce dominant representations of indigenous Australians as ‘lacking, ‘disadvantaged’, ‘victims’, or even ‘disruptive’ and ‘diversive’; representations which support the emergence of colonial power relations in the first place. They also support the ideal of a final social unity, which necessarily posits an end to history and ultimately eliminates the need for critique” (Bignall, 2007, pp. 197). An example might be summarized in the following statement quoted in Burhansstipanov, Christopher and Schumacher; “if the problems are in the community, the solutions are in the community” (2005 pp. 72). How does this distinguish itself from traditional developmentalist approaches, when the behaviour of the community is already defined as the problem that has to be “*solved*”? Maybe there might still be a role here for co-labour methodology and reciprocal processes in the sense of CBPR and what this article has also suggested, but the learning potential of such processes with regards to the development of critical awareness become extremely limited if the theoretical research problems are posed as if the community is already the problem. Or, in a more colloquial form; what can “*we*” possible hope to learn from “*them*” if “*they*” are the problem.

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